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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellant, Melissa L. Robertson ("Robertson" or 
"Beneficiary"), appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment to 
appellee, The Central Jersey Bank and Trust Company ("Bank" or 
"Trustee").  Robertson is the beneficiary of a testamentary trust 
that names the Bank as trustee.  She asserts that the district 
court erred in holding that a will provision authorizing the Bank 
to retain its own stock protected it from liability for failure 
to diversify trust assets when she failed to show that the 
Trustee acted either "recklessly or in disregard of [its] 
fiduciary duty of loyalty."  Robertson v. The Central Jersey Bank 
and Trust Company, No. 91-3383, slip op. at 11 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 
1993).  Robertson also contends that the district court erred 
when it held that she could not recover against the Bank for 
alleged mismanagement of the testator's estate prior to 
August 12, 1988, the date on which the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Law Division, Probate Part ("Probate Court") approved the 
Bank's account of its administration of the testator's estate. 
 We hold that the district court erred when it granted 
the Trustee summary judgment on Robertson's claim that the 
Trustee violated its fiduciary duty of care by keeping as much as 
95% of the trust assets invested in the Trustee's own corporate 
  
stock.  We also believe the district court erred in using 
recklessness, instead of due diligence, to define the standard of 
care New Jersey fiduciaries must meet when broadly authorized to 
retain trust investments.  On the present record, there remain 
genuine disputed issues of material fact as to whether the 
Trustee met the standard of care New Jersey requires fiduciaries 
to exercise to protect trust beneficiaries from investment 
losses.  We will therefore reverse that part of the district 
court's order granting the Bank summary judgment on Robertson's 
claim that it breached its fiduciary duty of care in retaining 
the investment of almost all of Robertson's trust in its own 
stock, without any attempt to diversify her trust's investments. 
 On the preclusion issue, we are in basic agreement with 
the district court's legal analysis.  We will modify its order, 
however, to limit preclusion to the period covered by the Bank's 
account, which ended March 21, 1988, rather than extending it, as 
the district court did, to August 12, 1988, the date the Probate 
Court entered its decree approving the Bank's account.1   
                     
1
  Although the district court relied on issue preclusion to bar 
Robertson's claim, we believe claim preclusion is the appropriate 
theory to apply in this case.  See Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 
F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Claim preclusion refers to the 
effect of a judgment in foreclosing litigation of a matter that 
never has been litigated, because of a determination that it 
should have been advanced in an earlier [proceeding].")  
(quotation and citation omitted); Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett 
Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Claim 
preclusion . . . is broader in effect [than issue preclusion] and 
prohibits reexamination not only of matters actually decided in 
the prior [proceeding], but also those that the parties might 
have, but did not, assert in that proceeding.").  The precluded 
claims include the Bank's sale of the "Fair Haven Property" which 
the Bank included in its accounting as personal representative.  
  
 
 I. 
 A. 
 
 Robertson is the step-granddaughter of Irene Lockwood 
Robertson ("Testator").  The Testator died on December 25, 1983. 
In her will, she created a trust in which she gave Robertson one 
half of any balance remaining in the trust upon the death of 
Testator's husband.  The will was admitted to probate by the 
Surrogate's Court of Monmouth County on January 23, 1984 and 
letters were issued to the Bank on the same day. 
 Article IV of the will gave the Testator's husband, 
Abraham Robertson (Robertson's grandfather), a life estate that 
included the marital residence, located at 62 Harvard Road, Fair 
Haven, New Jersey.  Article V placed the Testator's residuary 
estate in trust for the life of her husband, Abraham, and named 
the Bank trustee.  The Bank accepted this residuary trust on 
January 26, 1984.  Article VI directed the Trustee, upon the 
death of Testator's husband, to divide the balance of the 
residuary estate equally between Robertson and the Monmouth 
County Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.  Article VII 
of the will deferred distribution of Robertson's share of the 
corpus until she reaches age twenty-five. 
(..continued) 
Robertson also contends that the district court erred in 
concluding that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 56:8-2 (West 1989), was inapplicable to the Bank's failure 
to diversify trust assets.  We agree with the district court that 
a claim for failure to diversify trust assets is not among the 
fraudulent acts proscribed by the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.  
In addition, we agree with the district court that Robertson 
failed to show that the Bank breached its duty of loyalty. 
  
  The Testator's husband died in 1985.  Robertson's 
trust was separately funded in 1988.  At that time, 95% of its 
corpus was invested in the Bank's own corporate stock.  This 
stock had been held by the Testator at death.  Article X of the 
will gave the Trustee the power to retain any investments.  
Article X provides in part: 
 [T]he Trustee, . . . in addition to and not 
by way of limitation of the powers provided 
by law, shall, except as otherwise provided 
in this my Will, have the following powers to 
be exercised in its absolute discretion: To 
purchase or otherwise acquire and to retain 
any and all stocks, bonds, notes, or other 
securities, or any such variety of real or 
personal property, including interests in 
common trust funds and securities of or other 
interests in investment companies or 
investment trusts, whether or not such 
investments be of the character permissible 
for investments by fiduciaries and without 
regard to the effect of any such investment 
or reinvestment may have upon the 
diversification of investments . . . . 
 
Appellant's Appendix at 91-92.  It also provides: 
  I specifically authorize my corporate 
fiduciary to retain, temporarily or 
permanently, any or all of the stock of the 
corporate fiduciary owned by me at the time 
of my death in the form in which it then 
exists. 
 
 
Id. at 92. 
 In September 1987, the Bank filed its first account of 
its administration of Testator's estate.  It reported the 
estate's inventory and appraisements at an initial value of 
$919,425.19.  This included 34,277 shares of the Bank's corporate 
stock at a book value of $690,957.56.  The account showed that 
  
the Fair Haven property was sold for $138,347.03 on February 11, 
1986, following the death of the life tenant, Robertson's 
grandfather.  The account also showed that the Bank had sold more 
than 3,000 shares of its own corporate stock during the period 
covered, leaving a balance of 31,000 shares.  The shares 
remaining had a book value of $625,812.50, but the market value 
had increased to almost $1.5 million.  The estate's remaining 
corpus had a total book or inventory value of $775,837.62. 
 On March 21, 1988, the Bank supplemented its September 
1987 accounting and reported the book or inventory value of the 
Testator's estate at $779,670.03; in the six months or so between 
September 1987 to March 21, 1988, however, the market value of 
the Bank's stock had decreased approximately $300,000 to about 
$1.2 million. 
 In April 1988, the Bank asked the Probate Court to 
approve its administration of the estate and its residuary trust 
to March 21, 1988.  The court appointed Kerry E. Higgins, Esq. as 
guardian ad litem to protect Robertson's interest.  In June 1988, 
Higgins reported to the court that she had met with Robertson's 
parents, and they "expressed extreme dissatisfaction" with the 
Trustee's administration of the estate and trust, as well as its 
failure to communicate adequately with them.  Robertson's parents 
were particularly disturbed by the Bank's sale of the Fair Haven 
property without notice to them, despite their expressed interest 
in purchasing it.  In addition, they questioned the Bank's sale 
of some of its own stock.  After investigating these matters, 
however, Higgins reported that, in her opinion, both the Fair 
  
Haven property as well as the Bank's own corporate stock were 
properly sold for fair value. 
 On August 12, 1988, the Probate Court entered a 
judgment approving the Bank's administration of the estate and 
the trust the will created for the life of the Testator's 
husband, and discharged the Bank from liability for its conduct 
from the Testator's death through March 21, 1988.  The Probate 
Court held: 
 [The Bank], individually and as personal 
representative and trustee [of] aforesaid are 
hereby fully, finally and forever discharged 
and released of and from any and all 
liability and accountability with respect to 
the administration of the Will from the date 
they commenced serving as such personal 
representative and trustee, through and 
including March 21, 1988, the closing date of 
their First and Final Account and 
Supplemental Account, and thereafter. 
 
 
See In re Estate of Robertson, No. 134166, slip op. at 4 (N.J. 
Super. Ct., Law Div., Probate Part, filed Aug. 12, 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
 In or about September 1988, the Bank transferred 
Robertson's one-half share of the estate's residuary balance into 
a separate trust for her benefit.  Robertson and her parents 
received an opening statement that showed the Bank's stock 
passing to Robertson's trust at an opening book value of 
$309,878.12.  These shares again represented more than 95% of the 
$325,810.98 total book value of Robertson's trust.  On 
September 30, 1988, the market price of the Bank's stock was 
  
$21.00 per share.  Accordingly, it had a market value of 
$644,700.00 at that time. 
 In her deposition, Robertson testified that the Bank 
had begun giving her quarterly financial statements at the end of 
1988 and that she had examined them to determine the market value 
of the stock in her trust and the trust's total value.  Robertson 
realized that the Bank stock, which was transferred to her trust 
from the testator's estate, was the trust's main asset. 
 In January 1991, Robertson wrote to the Bank's trust 
committee seeking money to purchase a home from her parents near 
the college she was attending in Florida.  In that letter, 
Robertson also said that she was "deeply concerned" about the 
decline in value her trust account had suffered over the 
preceding year. 
 On February 8, 1991, the Bank sold 4,000 shares of its 
stock at $9.22 per share, for a total of $36,875.00, apparently 
to enable Robertson to purchase the Florida home from her 
parents.  In July 1991, Robertson again wrote to the Bank 
complaining about a decline in her quarterly income disbursements 
from about $7,000.00 to $5,000.00.  She also stated general 
dissatisfaction with the Bank's administration of her trust.  In 
the July letter she estimated that her trust's "long slide into 
the financial cellar" had reduced the value of the corpus of her 
trust by $500,000.00. 
  
 B. 
 On August 1, 1991, before the Bank responded to her 
July 1991 letter, Robertson commenced this action.2  In her 
complaint she claimed that the Bank had breached its fiduciary 
duties by permitting her trust account to suffer such a large 
decline in value, by selling the Fair Haven property below its 
fair market value and by violating the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act.  After completion of discovery, the Bank moved for summary 
judgment.  The district court granted the Bank's motion on 
December 9, 1993.  It concluded that the will provisions 
authorizing the Bank to retain assets excused it from all but 
reckless mismanagement and Robertson had failed to show that the 
Bank had acted "recklessly or in disregard of its fiduciary duty 
of loyalty."  Robertson, No. 91-3383, slip op. at 12.  The 
district court also concluded that Robertson was precluded from 
seeking damages for any alleged mismanagement of the trust during 
the period covered by the Bank's account, including its sale of 
the Fair Haven property.  Finally, the district court held that 
Robertson had failed to make out a claim under the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act.  Accordingly, it granted summary judgment to 
the Bank, holding that no material issues of fact remained.  
Robertson filed a timely notice of appeal on December 29, 1993. 
                     
2
  In an August 16, 1991 response to Robertson's letter, the Bank 
primarily attributed the decrease in her income distributions to 
the liquidation of principal that enabled Robertson to purchase 
the Florida home.  The Bank referred to its express authority to 
retain the stock the Testator had owned at the time of her death, 
but stated that it had nevertheless begun to make orderly 
reductions of the trust's investment in the Bank's own stock and 
would continue to do so. 
  
 
 II. 
 The district court had diversity jurisdiction over this 
case under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1993).  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the district court's final order granting 
summary judgment to the Trustee under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 
1993).  A district court's order granting summary judgment is 
subject to plenary review.  Public Interest Research Group of New 
Jersey Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1109 (1991).  Accordingly, 
"we apply the same test as the district court should have used 
initially."  Id. (citation omitted).  We evaluate the evidence in 
the same manner the district court should have, giving Robertson, 
the non-moving party, the benefit of every favorable inference 
that can be drawn from the record to determine if there are any 
remaining genuine issues of material fact that would enable her 
to prevail.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable 
Financial Management, Inc., 882 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
 
 III. 
 Because the district court exercised diversity 
jurisdiction over this matter, we are obliged to apply the 
substantive law of New Jersey, the state in which it sits.  Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor 
Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  Therefore, we must 
decide the extent to which a New Jersey trustee's fiduciary 
  
obligations are affected by trust provisions that not only grant 
them broad discretion in the investment of trust assets, but also 
broadly authorize retention of any assets the trust receives from 
the settlor or testator, without regard to diversification. 
 
 A. 
 The district court concluded that a fiduciary 
administering a New Jersey trust is governed by the standards set 
forth in the New Jersey Prudent Investment Law.  See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 3B:20-12 et seq. (West 1983) (the "Act" or "Prudent 
Investment Law.").  This statute was first enacted as N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 3A:15-18 et seq. (West 1951) and has not been amended in 
any respect material to this case thereafter.  See Fidelity Union 
Trust Co. v. Price, 93 A.2d 321, 325 (N.J. 1952) ("Unless the 
trust instrument provides otherwise, it is presumed that the 
trustor intended that his trustee should have the power to make 
such investments of the corpus of the trust as the Legislature in 
its wisdom might from time to time permit."). 
 Under the Prudent Investment Law, a trustee must act 
prudently in making or retaining trust investments.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 3B:20-13 (West 1983).  Prudence implies a duty to 
diversify.  See Commercial Trust Co. of N.J. v. Barnard, 142 A.2d 
865, 871 (N.J. 1958); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 229(d) 
(1992).  The Prudent Investment Law states: 
  In investing and reinvesting money and 
property of a trust and in acquiring, 
retaining, selling, exchanging and managing 
investments, a fiduciary shall exercise care 
and judgment under the circumstances then 
  
prevailing, which persons of ordinary 
prudence and reasonable discretion exercise 
in the management of and dealing with the 
property and affairs of another, considering 
the probable income as well as the probable 
safety of capital.  If the fiduciary has 
special skills or is named as the fiduciary 
on the basis of representations of special 
skills or expertise, he is under a duty to 
exercise those skills. 
 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:20-13 (West 1983). 
 The will creating Robertson's trust has a provision 
permitting retention of assets present at the inception of the 
trust.  For such a case, the Act provides: 
  If a trust instrument prescribes, 
defines, limits or otherwise regulates a 
fiduciary's powers, duties, acts, or 
obligations in acquiring, investing, 
reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling, 
valuing or otherwise acting with respect to 
the property of the trust estate, the trust 
instrument shall control notwithstanding this 
article; but nothing herein shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the Superior Court to order 
or authorize a fiduciary to depart from the 
express terms or provisions of a trust 
investment for the causes, in the manner, and 
to the extent otherwise provided by law. 
 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:20-15 (West 1983) (emphasis added);3 see 
also Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Earle, 108 A.2d 115, 116 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1954) ("Where . . . the decedent has in 
effect drafted a Prudent Man Investment Statute of his own and 
included it in his will, specifying in what manner and to what 
                     
3
  See infra note 6 for discussion of section 3B:20-15's effect 
when a trustee's power to retain assets is permissive as opposed 
to mandatory. 
  
extent his trustee may deviate from [the Act], the provisions of 
the will must prevail over the statute.").  The Testator's 
inclusion of a broad discretionary power to retain assets in 
Robertson's trust, without regard to diversification, brings us 
squarely up against the question of what limits, if any, New 
Jersey places upon broad retention provisions like the one in 
this will. 
 The Bank contends that the will's authorization to 
retain its own stock manifests the Testator's intent wholly to 
abrogate the prudent person standard a New Jersey fiduciary would 
otherwise owe a trust beneficiary.  If so, this will's retention 
power would completely insulate the Bank from fiduciary liability 
despite its failure to diversify the trust assets and its 
continued heavy investment of the trust's resources in its own 
stock.  Robertson, on the other hand, contends that the Bank's 
disproportionate retention of its own stock is so contrary to the 
most elementary principles of trust management that it cannot be 
excused by even the broadest retention power.  In support, 
Robertson relies on an expert witness who concluded that the Bank 
breached its duty of care, as well as its duty of loyalty, by 
continuing to invest so large a percentage of the assets of her 
trust in the Bank's own stock. 
 At first glance, the provisions of the Prudent 
Investment Law we have quoted seem to support the Bank's 
argument.   Examination of New Jersey case law applying the Act 
indicates to us, however, that retention provisions similar to 
  
the one before us do not grant trustees the sweeping exemption 
from fiduciary duties of care that the Bank proposes. 
 Generally, if the terms of a trust instrument authorize 
a trustee to retain investments that originally passed to it from 
the settlor of a testamentary trust, the trustee may retain them 
without liability.  See Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 60 
A.2d 630, 641 (N.J. Ch. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 77 A.2d 
219 (1950); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:20-15 (West 1983); Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts § 229(d) 1992.  Nevertheless, a trustee may not 
rely on a power to retain investments when circumstances make 
retention imprudent.  Plews, 60 A.2d at 648 (quoting Dickerson v. 
Camden Trust Co., 53 A.2d 225 (N.J. Ch. 1947), modified, 64 A.2d 
214 (N.J. 1949)).  Stated differently, "[e]ven where securities 
are retained by a trustee pursuant to . . . a direction in the 
will, the trustee is privileged to retain them only so long as 
they remain safe."  Id.; see also In re Munger's Estate, 309 A.2d 
205, 209 (N.J. 1973) ("The mere fact that the testator did not 
want his fiduciary bound by [the] statute does not of itself 
establish that [the testator] desired to authorize [certain 
investments]."); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 229(d) (same).  
In short, an authorization to retain investments enhances the 
trustee's discretion, but does not wholly insulate it from 
liability for its exercise of a power to retain assets.  Plews, 
93 A.2d at 641. 
 Thus, the first question that must be decided is the 
standard of care the Bank is required to exercise in managing a 
trust that permits it to retain its own stock.  Viewed from a 
  
different perspective, we might inquire into the extent to which 
this Testator wished to absolve her trustee of its usual duty to 
diversify.4  In considering these questions, we agree with the 
district court that New Jersey has rejected the Bank's broad 
argument that the retention clause completely absolves it from 
any duty to diversify.  See Plews, 60 A.2d at 641 ("The 
[retention] clauses adverted to do not of themselves absolve [a 
fiduciary] from liability. . . .").  It is, therefore, necessary 
to determine "whether the trustee so conducted itself as to 
warrant the granting of that protection with which it seeks to 
cloak itself under the [retention clause]."  Id. 
 
 B. 
                     
4
  Diversification is a uniformally recognized characteristic of 
prudent investment and, in the absence of specific authorization 
to do otherwise, a trustee's lack of diversification would 
constitute a breach of its fiduciary obligations.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 229(d); See also Erlich v. First 
Nat. Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 236 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1984) (An investment manager has an obligation to exercise 
prudence in diversifying investments to reduce the risk of large 
losses; indeed, diversification has been the accepted practice 
since "the early case of Dickinson's Appeal, 152 Mass. 184, 25 
N.E. 99 (1890)."); In re Ward Estate, 192 A. 68, 71, 73 (N.J. 
Prerog. Ct. 1936) ("No ordinarily prudent man would have 
recommended putting 95 per cent. of the fund in common stocks, 
certainly not in unlisted securities of a single locality. . . .  
This portfolio is too lopsided for safety."), aff'd, 191 A. 772 
(N.J. E.&A. 1937).  The Bank itself recognizes the importance of 
diversification.  Its own investment policy provides that 
excessive concentration of funds in any one issue should be 
avoided and that if greater than 10% of the equity portfolio is 
invested in one issue consideration should be given to reducing 
this concentration by diversifying. 
  
 In holding that the asset-retention provision did not 
"abrogate [the Trustee's] general obligation to invest with 
prudence," see Robertson, No. 91-3383, slip op. at 11, the 
district court decided that the asset-retention provisions of 
Article X of the will were "permissive," as opposed to 
"mandatory," see id., and that they did not deprive the Bank of 
power to sell the stock that it now holds for Robertson's 
benefit.  The district court analyzed the required standard of 
care as follows: 
 [I]f, by the express terms of the trust[,] 
the trustee is permitted but not required to 
retain certain investments originally 
transferred to the trust from the decedent's 
estate, the trustee is not liable for 
retaining them absent evidence that said 
trustee acted recklessly or in disregard of 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. 
 
 
See id. (emphasis added). 
 We believe that this unduly relaxes the standard of 
care a trustee owes the beneficiaries.  The prohibition against a 
fiduciary's retention of its own stock, which the common law once 
imposed, had as its rationale the fiduciary's duty of loyalty,5 
rather than its duty of care.  Like the district court, we do not 
think, however, that a permissive power to retain trust assets 
wholly absolves a trustee from liability for breach of its duty 
of care; but we disagree with the district court that the 
standard of care under an explicit power to do so is 
                     
5
  We reiterate our conclusion that Robertson has failed to show 
a breach of the duty of loyalty on this record.  See supra 
note 1. 
  
recklessness.  Instead we believe a trustee should exercise due 
diligence in deciding whether to retain its own stock as a trust 
investment.6 
 Here, however, the district court concluded that the 
trustee could not be held liable for alleged mismanagement of 
Robertson's trust, unless she showed that it acted "recklessly."   
See Robertson, No. 91-3383, slip op. at 11.  We recognize that a 
fiduciary specifically authorized to retain trust assets may 
decide to do so even though the value of the retained assets is 
declining or market indicators otherwise suggest its disposal.  
Still, a trustee must pay attention.  Its decision to retain the 
asset must be the result of a prudent, reasoned and deliberate 
decision-making process.  See In re Paterson Nat'l Bank, 4 A.2d 
59 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 12 A.2d 705 (N.J. E.&A. 1940), 
discussed infra at 21-23. 
                     
6
  Even a trustee faced with a mandatory retention provision can 
apply to the court for permission to dispose of any investment it 
is directed to retain.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:20-15 (West 
1983); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167 (1959); see also 
Plews, 60 A.2d at 648 (quoting In re Buckelew's Estate, 13 A.2d 
855 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 19 A.2d 779 (N.J. E.&A. 
1941)) ("It is the duty of a trustee to use every reasonable 
effort to inform itself as to the value and the soundness of the 
trust investments and to keep a careful check of fluctuating 
values.  If it be in doubt in a situation then it behooves it to 
seek instructions from the court as to its course of action in 
the premises.").  In fact, the Restatement concludes that, in 
emergency situations, the fiduciary may dispose of the security 
without first obtaining the court's permission, although such 
action would be subject to the court's subsequent approval.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167(2) and cmt. e.  We believe a 
permissive retention provision, like the one in this case, simply 
allows the fiduciary to avoid the delay and expense evident to 
court approval. 
  
 It is clear that the duty of a trustee to exercise care 
is affected by a retention provision.  See Price, 93 A.2d at 324.  
Neverthless, even one as broad as the one in Robertson's trust 
does not seem to us to lower the standard to recklessness.  Thus, 
in Plews, supra, the court analyzed the fiduciary obligations of 
a trustee that had wide discretion to retain specific assets and 
held that an asset-retention provision in a trust instrument 
could not 
 be said to relieve the [fiduciary] from 
exercising that degree of care and prudence 
normally required of a fiduciary nor to 
excuse a violation of a trust duty.  [Such 
authorization] does not permit the 
[fiduciary] to blindly retain such 
investments regardless of their value or 
sufficiency.  'Retaining investments is in 
effect making them.'  Under these clauses, 
the same fidelity, faithfulness, care and 
prudence is required. . . . 
 
 
60 A.2d at 641 (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 The Plews court reasoned that asset retention clauses 
merely "permit the retention of [the] testator's investments for 
such length of time as [the fiduciary] might deem proper," 
without regard to any statutory provision.  Id.  They do not 
absolve a fiduciary from exercising care and diligence in 
managing trust investments.  Id.  ("Even if [an authorization] 
clause serve[s] to permit [a] trustee to make [certain 
investments, otherwise inappropriate] it is still required to 
exercise that degree of care and prudence in handing [sic] the 
monies and affairs of the trust estate as is normally required of 
fiduciaries.") (emphasis added). 
  
 The Plews court reasoned further that fiduciaries which 
possess or hold themselves out to possess expertise in investment 
management can be more readily found to breach this standard.  It 
stated: 
  Normally, a trustee is required to 
exercise that degree of care and caution, 
skill, sagacity, and judgment, industry and 
diligence, circumspection and foresight, that 
an ordinary discreet and prudent person would 
employ in like matters of his own. 
 
  In the present case, the corporate 
trustee held itself out as an expert in the 
handling of estates and trust accounts.  It 
also held itself out as having particular 
departments for investments and statistical 
information, and especial skill in this 
respect.  It had so advertised for a number 
of years, and with the knowledge of the 
deceased, who had been a director at the time 
of his death and for many years theretofore.   
It therefore represented itself as being 
possessed of greater knowledge and skill than 
the average man and . . . so it was incumbent 
upon the trustees to exercise such care, 
skill, diligence, and caution as a man of 
ordinary prudence would practice in like 
matters of his own. . . .  And if the trustee 
possesses greater skill than a man of 
ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to 
exercise such skill as he has.  It was under 
a duty to exercise a skill greater than that 
of an ordinary man.  The manner in which 
investments were handled must be viewed and 
assayed in the light of such superior skill 
and ability. 
 
 
Id. at 642 (quotations and other citations omitted) (emphasis 
added).7 
                     
7
  See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:20-13; In re Estate of Killey, 
326 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. 1974) (citing Plews in rejecting trial 
court's use of ordinary negligence standard and holding instead 
that a trustee bank, which "held itself out as an expert in the 
  
 Applying these general principles to the facts before 
it, the Plews court held that the trustee had failed to exercise 
the degree of care, skill, diligence and fidelity generally 
required of a person with its skills and that the securities in 
question "were held beyond the time when they were safe."  Id. at 
648.  The court reached this conclusion even though it decided 
that there was no proof of wilful wrong, bad faith, fraud or 
gross misconduct.  We believe the Plews court's rejection of a 
gross misconduct standard forecloses use of the "reckless" 
standard the district court applied in the present case.  
Robertson, No. 91-3383, slip op. at 11. 
 Moreover, in Behrman v. Egan, 95 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1953), the court held trustees liable for a trust's 
losses despite an exculpatory provision insulating them from 
liability for mismanagement.  The court rejected the trustees' 
argument that the trust agreement "relieve[d] them from all 
responsibility for actions other than those which were the result 
of conscious wrongdoing."  Id. at 601 (emphasis added).   Rather 
the court held, "the [trustees] contention that the exculpatory 
clause saves the trustees from any penalty for conduct other than 
that which would, in effect, constitute an indictable offense, is 
untenable." Id.  It reasoned: 
  While consideration is given to such 
exculpatory provisions the courts construe 
(..continued) 
handling of estates and trust accounts[,]" was "under a duty to 
exercise a skill greater than that of an ordinary man and the 
manner in which investments were handled must accordingly be 
evaluated in light of such superior skill.") (footnote and 
citations omitted).  
  
them strictly and there appears to be a 
tendency to view such provisions with a 
searching scrutiny of the relation existing 
between the parties and the circumstances of 
the insertion of such a clause in a trust 
instrument.  Our courts have applied a strict 
construction to such exculpatory clauses and 
have said that they do not relieve a trustee 
of liability where a loss results from 
negligence in the administration of the 
trust.  Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 
142 N.J.Eq. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (Ch. 1948). 
 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (other citations omitted).  The Behrman 
court then held that "[t]he conduct of [a] trustee [is] to be 
measured by the principle that a trustee owes an obligation to 
the Cestuis and a duty to exercise that degree of care, prudence, 
circumspection and foresight, that an ordinary prudent person 
would employ in like matters of his own." Id. at 601-02 (emphasis 
added) (citing, among other cases, Paterson Nat'l Bank, supra). 
 We think the district court mistakenly relied on 
Paterson Nat'l Bank, supra, and Beam v. Paterson Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 92 A. 351 (N.J. E.&A. 1914), as authority for a 
standard of recklessness.  In Paterson Nat'l Bank, the will not 
only authorized and empowered the trustee to retain certain 
stock, but also expressly exempted it from liability for any loss 
resulting from such retention.  Paterson Nat'l Bank, 4 A.2d at 
61.  The court held that the trustees were not liable because 
"the trust was discussed and considered at practically every 
meeting" and the directors were "always of the opinion that the 
said stock should be retained."  Id. at 62.  It so held because 
there was no "proof that [the] trustee did not give diligent and 
  
careful consideration to the administration of its trust."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  It found instead that the trustee 
 exercised its best judgment and 
circumspection in determining whether to sell 
or retain the very stock which the testator 
himself had acquired and held as an 
investment.  Even if it could then have been 
definitely said and determined that it erred 
in its judgment, nevertheless that alone 
could not render it now liable to being 
surcharged. 
 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 Thus, although Paterson Nat'l Bank held that the 
trustee was not liable, it plainly said that even a trustee who 
is expressly absolved from liability for retention has to 
exercise due diligence in its exercise of a power to retain 
investments.  Specifically, the court stated: 
 [A] careful examination of the proofs here 
adduced fails to disclose any evidence of 
negligence on the part of the trustee either 
in the administration of the trust or in the 
retention of the stock in question.  All that 
the law exact[s] of [a] trustee in the 
administration of its stewardship [is] an 
obligation of faithfulness to the cestuis and 
a duty to exercise ordinary care, prudence 
and diligence. 
 
 
Id. at 61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Paterson, therefore, does not relieve a fiduciary with a power to 
retain trust assets from its duty to exercise due diligence.  See 
Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 71 A.2d 184, 188-189 (N.J. 1950) 
(citing Paterson Nat'l Bank in framing the issue as "whether the 
retention of the stock constituted negligence," as opposed to 
  
recklessness) (emphasis added); Berhman, 95 A.2d at 602 (citing 
Paterson Nat'l Bank as standing for the same proposition). 
 Likewise, we do not read Beam, 92 A. 351, to stand for 
the proposition that the standard of care governing a fiduciary 
administering a trust with broad retention powers like those we 
have here is recklessness.  Though the stocks and bonds the Beam 
trustee retained were, as here, those a testator had invested in 
during his lifetime, the record in Beam showed that the trustee 
had acted diligently to protect the beneficiary's interest.  
Thus, as in Paterson, the trustee was not held liable for the 
losses the trust suffered.8 
                     
8
  In the present case, during oral argument, the Bank's counsel 
stated that it decided to retain the stock in the Robertson trust 
account because it viewed itself as a candidate for takeover.  If 
supported by evidence, this could provide support for the 
proposition that the Bank exercised an appropriate degree of 
care.  Whether this would be sufficient to bring the Bank within 
the protection the asset-retention clause was intended to provide 
seems to us, however, to be a question of fact that cannot be 
decided on a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.  Robertson points 
to conflicting evidence, such as the Bank's policy on 
diversification and its conduct in the administration of similar 
accounts.  Resolution of these conflicts involves questions of 
fact, not law. 
  
 C. 
 Furthermore, since Paterson and Beam were decided, the 
New Jersey courts have been increasingly reluctant to excuse 
mismanagement by professional fiduciaries who hold themselves out 
to have expertise in trust administration.  See Erlich, 505 A.2d 
at 232 ("The policy of this State, expressed in both case law and 
statute, dictates that professionals be held to the standards of 
their professions in delivering services to their clients."). 
 In Erlich, for example, an investor brought an action 
against a corporate trustee and its former employee, seeking 
damages for alleged mismanagement of a custodian management 
account ("CMA").  There, 80%-90% of the portfolio (based on 
market value) was invested in the stock of one company.  When the 
value of this company's stock declined substantially the person 
who had created the account filed a claim against the Bank 
alleging negligence, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of contract. 
 The Ehrlich beneficiary had significant control over 
investments and "[n]o stock was ever purchased or sold without 
[his] written authorization."  Id. at 228.  In addition, the 
custodial agreement between the bank and investor had an 
exculpatory clause relieving the bank from liability not only for 
investment recommendations it made in good faith, but also for 
failure to make recommendations.  The court held that this 
exculpatory clause was void and unenforceable, reasoning that to 
"allow investment advisers to exculpate themselves from the 
mischief caused by their breach of duty would violate the public 
  
policy of this State." Id. at 233.  Instead, it held the trustee 
to the following standard of care: 
  A professional must exercise that degree 
of care, knowledge and skill ordinarily 
possessed and exercised in similar situations 
by the average member of the profession 
practicing in his field. . . .  It is 
therefore the degree of care, knowledge and 
skill expected of professional investment 
advisors to which we must look for the 
standard of care. 
 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The Ehrlich court concluded that "it was not prudent of the Bank 
to use a single stock strategy for plaintiff, given his 
circumstances," id. at 235, and held the bank "negligent in its 
supervision and periodic review of the account, its failure to 
provide for diversification and its failure to consider the risks 
[of non-diversification] to plaintiff."  Id. at 238.9 
 In In re Estate of Bayles, 261 A.2d 684 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1970), the court similarly held an executor liable 
for retaining approximately 60% of a trust's corpus in a stock as 
it declined in value.10  Because the executor was an attorney who 
was experienced in the administration of estates, the court 
                     
9
  In this case, there is a similar agreement between the Bank 
and Testator, separate from her will.  Erlich clearly shows that 
this agreement cannot insulate the Bank from liability for 
mismanagement of Robertson's trust. 
10
  Distinguishing the duties of trustees and executors, the 
Bayles court stated that trustees are usually held to higher 
standards than personal representatives, but nevertheless held 
that even "[an executor] may be held liable for loss if he 
retains stock or other securities beyond a reasonable time for 
sale."  Bayles, 261 A.2d at 689. 
  
stated that he should have taken prompt steps to liquidate the 
stock of a single company that represented more than half the 
value of the estate's investments and was undergoing volatile 
price changes.  The Court held him liable, despite a finding that 
he did not act recklessly or in bad faith.11 
 
 D. 
 We believe these decisions also require us to consider 
asset-retention powers in conjunction with the Testator's purpose 
and her objective in creating the trust in light of the trust 
agreement read as a whole.  See Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
§ 229(d) (Retention authorization and other exculpatory language 
"does not allow the trustee to act in a state of mind not 
contemplated by the settlor.") (emphasis added); Plews, 60 A.2d 
at 639-40 (same); In re Munger's Estate, 309 A.2d at 208 (same).  
This Testator created a trust to postpone distribution of 
substantial wealth.  Its preservation requires skillful and 
diligent investment until Robertson attains age twenty-five, now 
two years in the future.  We do not believe the Testator intended 
to authorize the Bank to retain an inordinate percentage of the 
trust's assets in its own stock without exercising due diligence.  
                     
11
  See also Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 350 A.2d 279, 
282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("'We find the public need 
for professional and competent banking services too great and the 
legitimate and justifiable reliance upon the integrity and safety 
of financial institutions too strong to permit a bank to contract 
away its liability for its failure to provide the service and 
protections its customers justifiably expect, that is, for its 
failure to exercise due care and good faith. . . .") (quotation 
omitted), certif. denied, 361 A.2d 532 (N.J. 1976). 
  
Were we to so hold, we believe we would permit this Trustee to 
act without regard for the Testator's purpose of protecting 
Robertson against inept or rash youthful investment.12 
 Based on all these cases, we believe New Jersey holds a 
Trustee who has a broad discretionary power to retain its own 
stock, to a due diligence standard, rather than recklessness.13  
Under a due diligence standard, the question whether the Bank's 
liability for breach of the fiduciary duty of care it owes 
Robertson cannot be decided in the Bank's favor on the record now 
before us on a summary judgment motion.14 
                     
12
  It also seems to us that the Testator's intent may be a fact 
question, which would be inappropriately disposed of on a summary 
judgment motion.  See Shanley & Fisher, P.C. v. Sisselman, 521 
A.2d 872, 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("[T]he court 
should be particularly hesitant in granting summary judgment 
where questions dealing with subjective elements such as 
intent . . . [is] involved.") (citations omitted). 
13
  New Jersey's due diligence standard is not in conflict with 
the Restatement of Trusts, nor does it seem precluded by the 
dicta in Paterson Nat'l Bank on which the district court relied 
when it adopted a standard of recklessness to judge the Bank's 
continued investment of almost the entire corpus of Robertson's 
trust in its own stock. 
14
  Our conclusion is supported by the decisions of courts in 
other states.  See First Alabama Bank of Huntsville v. Spragins, 
475 So. 2d 512, 516 (Ala. 1985) ("We agree with the general 
proposition that the duties and obligations of the trustee are 
governed in large measure by the terms of the trust instrument.  
We do not agree, however, that this proposition can be applied 
here to lessen the duty imposed by the "prudent person" 
standard.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Union Commerce 
Bank v. Kusse, 251 N.E.2d 884, 890 (Ohio Prob. 1969) 
("[U]nlimited investment authority given to [a trustee in a] will 
does not relieve the fiduciary from the obligation of due care 
and prudence. . . .  When the fiduciary is a corporate executor 
and trustee, with greater skill and facilities for handling trust 
estates than those possessed by the 'ordinary prudent man,' such 
fiduciary is held to a higher degree of care, consonant with its 
  
 
 
 V.  Conclusion 
 We will reverse the district court's order granting the 
Bank summary judgment.  We will modify that part of the district 
court's order precluding claims for mismanagement on the basis of 
claim preclusion to bar Robertson's claims up to March 21, 1988, 
instead of August 12, 1988.  Finally, we will affirm the holding 
of the district court that the Bank did not violate its duty of 
loyalty and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
(..continued) 
greater skill and facilities.") (citations omitted); Starks v. 
United States Trust Co. of N.Y., 445 F. Supp. 670, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978) ("A trustee's performance is not judged by success or 
failure . . . and while negligence may result in liability, a 
mere error in judgment will not.") (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted); Estate of Killey, 326 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. 1974) (citing 
Plews, 60 A.2d 630) (rejecting trial court's use of ordinary 
negligence standard and holding, when a trustee bank "held itself 
out as an expert in the handling of estates and trust 
accounts[,] . . . [i]t was . . . under a duty to exercise a skill 
greater than that of an ordinary man and the manner in which 
investments were handled must accordingly be evaluated in light 
of such superior skill.") (footnote and other citations omitted).  
  
